













This	 paper	 analysed	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 of	 a	






this	 tendency	stopped.	However,	after	 that	and	during	 the	presidencies	of	Fernandez	de	
Kirchner	a	more	volatile	and	contradictory	scenario	was	generated.	The	incarceration	rate	
between	 2002	 and	 2014	 in	 Argentina	 grew	 substantially	 as	 did	 the	 rate	 of	 convictions.	
Meanwhile	the	percentage	of	suspended	sentences	as	part	of	the	total	convictions	and	the	
percentage	 of	 custodial	 sanctions	 both	 fell.	 Especially	 in	 relation	 to	 incarceration,	 these	
levels	of	change	are	not	as	stark	as	those	of	 the	preceding	decades.	However,	 the	trends	
persist.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 transcend	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 punitive	 turn	






















governments	were	 constructed	out	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 political	 programs	and	alliances.	 The	
government	 of	 the	 Radical	 Civic	 Union	 led	 by	 President	 Alfonsin	 (1983‐1989),	 which	 built	 a	
political	 program	 based	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘social	 liberalism’,	 began	 the	 transition	 process.	 The	
economic	crisis	of	July	1989	led	to	an	early	handover	of	command	to	the	new	President,	Carlos	
Menem,	who	was	elected	by	the	opposition	Justicialist	Party,	the	institutional	form	of	the	Peronist	



























involved	 a	 new	 hybridization	 of	 the	 Peronist	 tradition	 with	 ‘postneoliberal’	 rhetoric	 and	
proposals	that	positioned	it	as	an	antagonist	to	the	1990s,	the	Menemist	decade.	After	a	fragile	
start,	this	political	alliance	and	program	consolidated	during	the	2005	legislative	elections,	and	




















some	 influential	 opponents	 –	 especially	 those	 who	 are	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 neoliberal	
principles	–	as	a	break	with	the	recent	past	in	which	neoliberalism	as	a	governmental	rationality	















by	 repeating	 his	 own	 past	 proposals	 –	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 death	 penalty,	 decreasing	 the	
minimum	 age	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 to	 which	 he	 added	 reversing	 the	 legal	
prohibition	of	the	Armed	Forces	to	participate	in	the	‘fight	against	crime’,	which	prohibition	had	
been	 one	 of	 the	 important	 progresses	made	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	
(Kessler	2010:	78).	By	contrast,	as	a	perverse	outcome	of	the	neoliberal	reforms	carried	out	in	
the	1990s,	Kirchner	constructed	an	antithetical	discourse	that	strongly	linked	people’s	feelings	of	
insecurity	 due	 to	 crime	 to	 the	 social	 question	 –	 increased	 poverty,	 unemployment	 and	 social	
inequality	 –	 and	 advocated	 for	 emphasizing	 ‘social	 inclusion’	 and	 ‘crime	 prevention’.	 This	
message	was	combined	with	an	appeal	for	the	need	to	prosecute	the	crimes	of	the	powerful,	such	
as	corruption	or	tax	evasion.	After	the	inauguration	of	President	Kirchner	an	official	rhetoric	from	
















alliance	 was	 developed	 between	 most	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 organizations	 in	 Argentina	 and	
Kirchnerism,	which	produced	multiple	subsequent	effects.	This	resulted	in	a	strong	presence	of	
the	human	rights	theme	in	both	the	official	agenda	and	rhetoric,	especially	in	relation	to	the	State	
crimes	 committed	 during	 the	 last	 military	 dictatorship.	 As	 a	 result,	 an	 important	 process	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 trial	 and	 punishment	 of	 these	 crimes	 by	 the	 federal	 criminal	 justice	 system	
gradually	emerged	(CELS	2013;	Feierstein	2014;	Zysman	Quiros	2015).	This	decision,	which	was	
sustained	 over	 time,	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 attitude	 towards	 Kirchnerism	 as	 a	
political	ally	in	relation	to	penality.	As	I	have	argued	with	respect	to	penal	policy	at	the	beginning	





















five	 million	 signatures,3	 requested	 the	 executive	 and	 legislative	 authorities	 of	 the	 national	
government	and	the	government	of	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires	implement	reforms	that	focused	
on	 the	 increase	of	penal	 severity.	 This	 request	was	 accompanied	by	 the	 constant	presence	of	
Blumberg’s	father	in	the	mass	media	and	by	a	number	of	massive	demonstrations	that	pressured	
political	 bodies.	 The	 first,	which	was	 held	 in	 front	 of	 the	National	 Congress	 on	 1	 April	 2004,	
brought	together	around	150,000	people.	
	




around	 the	 figure	of	 the	 victim	as	 a	 subject,	with	moral	authority	born	out	of	 suffering.4	This	




middle‐class	 –	 are	 redeemed	 here	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 expert	 knowledge.	 This	 development	
shakes	and	challenges	‘the	establishment’	in	the	field	of	crime	control	policies.	In	the	case	of	the	
Axel	Crusade,	the	establishment	consisted	of	law	professors	and	judicial	officials	who,	since	the	
late	1990s,	had	 frequently	been	stigmatized	with	 the	adjective	of	 ‘garantista’,	 and	 in	 so	doing	
reviled	as	the	‘defenders	of	the	criminals’.	But	professional	politicians,	actors	who	had	only	lent	
an	ear	to	the	expert	knowledge,	had	also	moved	away	from	‘what	the	people	think	and	want’.	On	
many	 occasions,	 Blumberg	 himself	 insisted	 on	 his	 ‘apolitical’	 nature,	 overcoming	 political	












The	 Axel	 Crusade	 generated	 strong	 responses,	 both	 from	 the	 Executive	 Power	 and	 from	 the	
Legislative	Power	at	national	and	at	provincial	levels,	especially	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires,	






citizenry’	 in	 favor	 of	 police	 and	 penal	 hardening,	without	 at	 any	moment	 problematizing	 the	
actual	composition	of	these	collective	mobilizations.	The	preferred	instrument	for	this	reaction,	










In	 this	 context,	 several	 legal	 changes	 developed	 that	 were	 clearly	 focused	 on	 increasing	
punitiveness	and,	in	so	doing,	reproduced	a	trend	that	has	been	observed	in	other	contexts	(Pratt	















key	 players,	 including	 the	 President	 himself,	 met	 with	 Blumberg	 and	 maintained	 a	 cautious	
attitude	towards	his	demands	and	proposals.	It	is	true	that,	on	the	one	hand,	some	Kirchnerist	
actors	publicly	spoke	out	against	his	initiatives,	especially	in	the	second	half	of	2004	when	they	









from	above’	 had	broken	with	 a	mode	of	 penal	policy‐making	 that	was	highly	 elitist,	 centered	
around	the	voice	of	experts	in	the	field	of	criminal	law,	that	had	a	particular	focus	on	the	‘ought	

























to	 the	 criticism	and	 distrust	 toward	political	 and	 institutional	 authorities	 (Sozzo	2016a:	 203‐
204).	
	
The	 ‘crisis	 of	 insecurity’	 in	 the	 public	 and	 political	 sphere	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	 also	 played	 a	








However,	 similar	 to	 Katherine	 Beckett	 (1997),	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 the	 naive	
interpretation	 that	 automatically	 ties	 the	 increase	 in	 street	 crime	 to	 the	 increased	 concern	of	






not	univocally	but	 rather	 through	 conflicts	 and	 struggles	 (Beckett	 and	 Sasson	2001;	 see	 also,	
Barker	2009;	Lacey	2008;	Savelsberg	1994,	1999;	Sparks	2003a;	Zimring	and	Johnson	2006).	In	
fact,	as	I	illustrated	earlier,	a	significant	increase	of	street	crime	in	Argentina	during	the	first	stage	
of	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 –	 or	 at	 least	 as	 registered	 by	 the	 official	 statistics	 –	 was	 not	
accompanied	 by	 a	 corresponding	 growth	 of	 punitiveness	 (Sozzo	 2011b;	 2013).	 However,	 an	
increase	 in	 street	 crime,	 especially	 when	 rates	 grow	 quickly	 and	 on	 an	 elevated	 scale,	 may	














identity	–	meaning	 the	new	postneoliberal	 face	of	 the	Peronist	 tradition	–	as	 it	 sought	 to	gain	
political	and	electoral	consensus	centered	on	an	agenda	of	 reform	measures;	 for	example,	 the	






response	 to	 perceived	 sustained	 and	 univocal	 social	 pressure.	 However,	 there	 were	 also	
Kirchnerist	actors	who	acted	out	 ‘of	conscience’,	as	they	had	actively	supported	the	preceding	








authority’s	 resort	 to	 repressive	 instruments	 as	 a	 way	 to	 at	 least	 provide	 the	 appearance	 of	








punitiveness	 (Brodeur	 2007;	 Kommer	 2004;	 Nelken	 2005,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Pease	 1994;	 Tonry	
2007).	But	 it	must	be	recognized	that	 it	allows	us	to	approach	the	crucial	phenomenon	of	the	
degree	of	extension	of	the	penal	system	(Beckett	and	Sasson	2001;	Cavadino	and	Dignam	2006;	





With	 regard	 to	 imprisonment,	 the	 rate	 of	 123	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	 2002	
increased	 to	 144	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	 2005.	 Excluded	 from	 this	 are	 persons	
deprived	 of	 their	 liberty	 in	 police	 headquarters	 and	 precincts	 that	were	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 or	
convicted,	which	number	was	not	officially	reported.	This	implies	an	increase	of	17	per	cent	in	
three	years.	With	regard	to	convictions,	the	number	increased	from	25,538	in	2002	to	32,965	in	

















declining	 poverty	 and	 unemployment	 levels	 through	 a	 heterodox	 economic	 policy	 strategy	
against	the	‘Washington	consensus’;	the	renationalization	of	public	services	that	were	privatized	






the	 progressive	 governments	 of	 the	 region	 such	 as	 Brazil	 and	 Venezuela;	 the	 early	 debt	
repayment	to	the	IMF;	and	so	on	(Novaro	2010:	298;	Svampa	2011:	23‐27,	2013:	14).	
	
Within	 this	 context	 the	 fourth	March	 of	 the	 Axel	 Crusade	 occurred	 in	 April.	 The	 new	 public	
























Another	 important	 element	was	also	 incorporated	at	 the	start	of	2005	within	 the	Province	of	
Buenos	Aires.	The	Center	for	Legal	and	Social	Studies,	one	of	the	most	important	human	rights	
organizations	in	Argentina,	had	in	2001	presented	a	collective	action	of	corrective	habeas	corpus	




to	 cease	 operating	 in	 ways	 that	 worsened	 the	 detention	 conditions	 in	 their	 territory.	
Furthermore,	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires	 was	 ordered	 to	 generate	 a	
roundtable	discussion	with	the	complainants	in	order	to	improve	the	detention	conditions	and	to	
consider	 the	 rules	 that	 determined	 the	Minimum	Standard	 for	 the	Treatment	 of	 Prisoners	 as	
developed	by	the	United	Nations	(Ales,	Borda	and	Alderete	Lobo	2005;	CELS	2005,	2007).	That	
said,	the	most	important	outcome	of	the	case	was	the	triggering	of	a	criminal	procedure	reform	
that	 reversed	 some	 previous	 changes	 made	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Procedure	 Code	 in	 relation	 to	
prisoners	on	remand.	This	ruled	out	the	existence	of	offences	in	which	it	was	mandatory	to	use	














few	 occasions	 that	 she	 did	 refer	 to	 the	matter,	 adopted	 the	 general	 position	which	 had	 also	
characterized	 the	electoral	 rhetoric	of	her	husband	 in	2003	 (CELS	2008;	Colombo	2011).	 She	
























During	 this	 period	 Kirchnerism	 even	 created	 certain	 incipient	 actions	 that	 advanced	 in	 the	
opposite	 direction,	 towards	 the	 reversal	 of	 previous	waves	 of	 penal	 populism.	 Some	 of	 these	




the	 implementation	of	 that	court	 ruling,	some	Kirchnerist	actors	 from	the	Province	of	Buenos	










in	 this	 period.	 This	 recovery	 generated	 concrete	 social	 effects	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 reduction	 of	
unemployment	 and	 poverty;	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 purchasing	 power	 of	 wages;	 and	 the	
strengthening	of	labor	guarantees	for	the	formal	sectors	of	the	labor	market.	In	this	economic	and	
social	scene,	 it	became	somewhat	more	difficult	 than	 in	 the	 recent	past	 for	street	crime	to	be	













compliance	 –	 to	 29,804	 in	 2007,	 a	 decrease	 of	 10	per	 cent.	 In	 2007	 conditional	 and	 effective	
compliance	convictions	became,	respectively,	38	per	cent	and	62	per	cent.	In	2005	85	per	cent	of	









in	 the	development	 of	 Kirchnerism.	 This	 third	period	was	marked	by	 the	 consolidation	 of	 its	






months	 and	 was	 accompanied	 by	 roadblocks	 and	 strong	 public	 demonstrations	 that	 were	
supported	by	various	political	opposition	parties	and	sections	of	the	middle	classes.	In	the	end,	
the	Kirchnerism	proposal	was	defeated	by	a	key	vote	on	 the	matter	 in	 the	National	Congress,	
which	triggered	a	series	of	conflicts	within	the	alliance	that	resulted	in	its	weakening.	In	fact,	this	





does	 not	 exceed	 the	minimum	wage;	 the	Marriage	 Equality	 Act;	 and	 so	 on.	 These	 initiatives	
generated	 various	 political	 triumphs,	 reinforced	 the	 postneoliberal	 elements	 of	 its	 political	
program,	and	reactivated	the	historical	binary	schemes	of	the	Argentinean	politics:	the	‘popular’	
and	the	‘anti‐popular’;	‘Peronism’	and	‘anti‐Peronism’.	The	death	of	Néstor	Kirchner	in	October	







to	 the	 international	 economic	 crisis	 but	 also	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 economic	 policies	
adopted	by	the	Kirchnerist	governments	since	2003.	Fundamentally,	this	was	crystallized	in	high	
inflation	and	in	its	impact	on	the	purchasing	power	of	wage	earners	which	was	partly	moderated,	
however,	 by	 annual	 wage	 increases	 between	 formal	 workers.	 But	 it	 was	 also	 translated	 as	
problems	 related	 to	 the	 exchange	 market	 and	 tax	 policy.	 Additionally	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	
national	 government,	 especially	 among	 the	middle	 classes,	was	 affected	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	
corruption	scandals	intensively	covered	by	the	mass	media,	particularly	by	those	enterprises	that	
opposed	this	governmental	alliance	and	program	(Svampa	2013).	 In	this	new	time	of	political	
weakness,	 Kirchnerism	 lost	 the	 legislative	 elections	 of	 October	 2013	 in	 the	 most	 important	
jurisdictions	but	remained	the	political	force	with	the	highest	number	of	votes	at	a	national	level	
even	though	the	numbers	were	far	from	the	levels	of	adhesion	during	the	presidential	elections.	










On	 a	national	 level,	 a	more	 ambiguous	 rhetoric	with	 regard	 to	 crime	 and	punishment	 can	be	
observed	 among	 key	 Kirchnerist	 actors	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 governments	 of	 President	
Fernández.	At	certain	times	and	on	certain	 issues	 it	 incorporated	elements	that	supported	the	
increase	of	penal	severity	–	such	as	the	need	to	be	more	restrictive	with	parole	or	the	decrease	of	
the	 minimum	 age	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 –	 but	 it	 never	 completely	 lost	 the	 fundamental	
features	that	were	previously	registered.	These	punitive	drifts	 in	the	official	rhetoric	occurred	
especially	in	times	of	political	weakness	such	as	during	the	campaigns	for	the	legislative	elections	
in	 2009	 and	 2013.	 Conversely,	 at	 a	 time	 of	 political	 strength	 during	 the	 campaign	 for	 the	
presidential	elections	in	2011,	the	tactics	of	this	political	alliance	presented	some	characteristics	
that	were	very	similar	to	those	of	the	2007	elections.	The	Kirchnerist	candidates,	especially	the	
President,	 took	 the	crime	problem	off	 center	stage	and	avoided	making	comments	 in	 favor	of	


















The	 Kirchnerist	 political	 alliance	 did,	 however,	 support	 and	 promote	 a	 series	 of	 successful	







and	 reverse	 those	 inequalities.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 promoted	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 2008	 law	 on	
Prevention	and	Punishment	of	Human	Trafficking	and	the	Assistance	of	 its	Victims,	with	2012	






Simultaneously	 this	 governmental	 alliance	 promoted	 the	 enactment	 of	 some	 laws	 related	 to	









in	 the	 logic	of	 the	 rewards	 system	 that	was	 typical	 for	 the	 legal	prison	 regime	 in	 the	country	





































































Kirchnerism	 as	 a	 political	 alliance	 and	 program	 greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 the	
conditions	that	made	this	possible	between	2005	and	2007.	This	occurred	for	the	first	time	since	
the	 fall	of	 the	punitiveness	 indicators	 at	 the	 start	of	 the	 transition	 to	democracy	 in	Argentina	
between	1983	and	1984	 (Sozzo	2011a,	2011b,	2013).	 It	was	not	 so	much	because	direct	 and	
specific	 actions	 and	 initiatives	 were	 promoted	 in	 this	 direction,	 although	 some	 were,	 with	 a	
limited	scope.	This	outcome	was,	instead,	produced	indirectly	by	Kirchnerism,	by	filling	the	public	
and	political	debate	with	other	themes	that	were	related	to	its	political	program,	which	generated	
intense	 social	 conflicts	 and	 antagonists.	 In	 so	 doing,	 it	 displaced	 the	 crime	 problem	 from	 its	
previous	center‐stage,	a	 fruitful	position	 for	a	dynamic	of	penal	hardening	within	 the	game	of	
electoral	 and	 political	 competition.	 The	 process	 of	 economic	 recovery	 and	 its	 positive	 social	
effects,	 generated	 by	 post‐crisis	 public	 policies	 within	 a	 favorable	 international	 context,	 also	











tied	 largely	 to	 its	moments	 of	 political	 and	 electoral	 weakness	 and	 strength,	 but	 also	 to	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 its	 composition,	 especially	 in	 certain	 provincial	 jurisdictions,	 something	 not	

























politics’	 in	 my	 opinion	 largely	 reflects	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 circumstances	 of	 their	
observations:	the	erosion	of	borders	in	programmatic	terms	between	the	major	political	parties	
in	 English‐speaking	 countries	 like	 the	 United	 States,	 Great	 Britain,	 Australia	 or	 New	 Zealand,	














of	 contemporary	 punishment,	 understood	 as	 ‘events	 that	 are	 largely	 unpredictable	 for	 social	
theory	 but	 nevertheless	 bring	 consequences	with	 it’.	 Of	 course,	 it	 also	means	 taking	 the	 role	








and	the	percentage	of	custodial	sanctions	of	 less	 than	 three	years	as	part	of	 the	 total	number	
custodial	sanctions	decreased	by	11	per	cent.	Especially	in	relation	to	incarceration,	these	levels	














































Power	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Kirchnerist	 legislators.	 The	 legal	 text	 was	 criticized	 by	 numerous	 human	 rights	








8	 In	 the	policing	 field,	 the	revival	of	a	 reformist	 impulse	could	be	mentioned	 in	 late	2010,	with	 the	creation	of	 the	
national	Ministry	of	Security,	with	ambitious	prospects	but	only	 limitedly	deployed	 in	2011	and	2012	and	with	a	
sharp	decline	in	the	last	three	years	(CELS	2012,	2013;	Sain	2012a,	2012b;	Sozzo	2014).	
9	This	ratifies	the	importance	of	exploring	the	weight	of	the	sub‐national	politics	in	federal	states	like	Argentina	when	
fully	trying	to	grasp	the	link	between	politics	and	penalty,	given	that	there	can	exist	sources	of	divergence	between	
the	federal	and	provincial	levels	‐	as	has	been	sustained	in	the	case	of	the	United	States,	among	others	(Barker	2006,	
2009;	Beckett	and	Western	2001;	Greenberg	and	West	2001;	Lynch	2009,	2011;	Miller	2008;	Newburn	2010;	Sasson	
2000;	Sheingold	1991).	
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